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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JEFFREY DON IRELAND : Case No. 20021053 - CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). The Honorable Sheila K. McCleve, Judge, Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah sentenced Defendant/Appellant Jeffrey 
Don Ireland ("Appellant" or "Mr. Ireland") and entered judgment of conviction for 
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance (Count I), a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002), and Driving With a Measurable 
Controlled Substance In The Body (Count 2), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.6 (1998). R. 191-192. A copy of the Judgment is in 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
The trial court determined that it was unnecessary for the state to prove where 
Mr. Ireland ingested methamphetamine, finding instead that Utah had jurisdiction 
because "possession or use" of a controlled substance in Utah under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-2(l)(dd) could be established based solely on evidence of 0.1 mcg/ml 
methamphetamine in Mr. Ireland's blood. 
Issue. Whether the trial court violated Mr. Ireland's right to due process by ruling 
that it had jurisdiction over Count I, finding that "consumption" within the definition of 
"possession or use" of a controlled substance under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd) 
(2002) is an ongoing process which includes the physiological metabolism of the 
substance? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Johnson. 2002 UT App 431, % 463 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
("Whether the district court erred in concluding that Utah has jurisdiction is a question of 
law that [this Court] review[s] for correctness."). 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 83-93, 206-208, 248:115-122. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutes and constitutional provisions are in 
AddendumB: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1 )(dd) (2002); 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-201, -202, and 501(3) (1999); 
Utah Const, art I, § 7; 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 19, 2002, the state charged Mr. Ireland with one count of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance (Count I)1, a third degree felony and one count of 
Driving with a Measurable Controlled Substance in the Body (Count 2), a class B 
misdemeanor. R. 1-3. On May 14, 2002, during the preliminary hearing Mr. Ireland 
argued that Count I should not be bound over due to insufficient proof of jurisdiction. R. 
84. The magistrate refiised to address this argument and ordered the case bound over. R. 
84. In response to Mr. Ireland's jurisdiction argument, the state filed a motion for a 
pretrial ruling on jurisdiction with the trial court on August 29, 2002. R. 84. On 
September 9, 2002, the trial court heard arguments addressing the trial court's 
jurisdiction over Count I. R. 248:115-122. On December 17, 2002, the trial court ruled 
that it had jurisdiction over Count I. R. 206-208. 
On September 30, 2002, Mr. Ireland, with the agreement of both the state and the 
trial court, entered a conditional guilty plea to both charges pursuant to State v. Sery. 758 
P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). R. 169-178; 254. On November 18, 2002, the trial 
court sentenced Mr. Ireland to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years on Count I 
and 180 days on Count 2 to run concurrently with Count 1. R. 191-196; 255. Mr. 
Ireland is not incarcerated. 
'The information charged Mr. Ireland with "Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance.11 R. 1-3. Later, Count I was defined as "Illegal Poss/Use of Controlled 
Substance." R. 25-27. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of November 3, 2001, the pickup truck Mr. Ireland was driving 
collided with another vehicle. R. 2, 76, 184. The driver of the other vehicle, Angel 
Garcia, died instantly as a result of the collision. R. 76,184. No reports were made 
about whether Mr. Ireland appeared impaired at the accident scene. R. 184. Mr. Ireland 
was transported by ambulance to Pioneer Valley Hospital. R. 76, 184; 248:15. The 
ambulance attendant believed Mr. Ireland smelled of alcohol. R. 76, 184. While at the 
hospital, officers asked Mr. Ireland to voluntarily submit to a blood draw. R. 76. Mr. 
Ireland refused the officers' request. R. 76, 184. Officer Scott Buchanan from the West 
Valley Police Department was sent to the hospital to perform drug recognition tests and 
assess Mr. Ireland. R. 76, 184. Neither the deputy nor Officer Buchanan smelled 
alcohol on Mr. Ireland. R. 184. 
Officer Buchanan requested Mr. Ireland to cooperate with the drug recognition 
tests. R. 77, 184. Mr. Ireland refused to cooperate with Officer Buchanan, covering his 
eyes so that they could not be assessed and requested an attorney. R. 77, 184. Despite 
these limitations on Officer Buchanan's observations, he opined that Mr. Ireland was 
under the influence of an analgesic narcotic. R. 77, 185. Officer Buchanan based his 
opinion on several factors including Mr. Ireland's constricted pupils, 98 degree 
temperature, droopy eyelids, dry mouth, muscle tremors, and his slow speech. R. 77, 
185-86; 248:11-13. Based on these observations, a search warrant was obtained to draw 
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Mr. Ireland's blood. R. 77, 185. A sample of Mr. Ireland's blood and urine2 were taken. 
R. 185. Mr. Ireland's blood and urine results were negative for the suspected narcotic 
analgesics, as well as, for alcohol and benzodiazepines (Valium-type medications). R. 
185. His blood did test positive for 0.1 mcg/ml methamphetamine. R. 185. None of the 
physical factors described by Officer Buchanan were consistent with methamphetamine 
use. R. 186. 
Despite the fact that no methamphetamine was found packaged for consumption 
in Mr. Ireland's possession, Mr. Ireland was arrested and charged with Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance (Count I), a third degree felony and Driving with a 
Measurable Controlled Substance in the Body, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1-9. Mr. 
Ireland argued at the preliminary hearing that because no controlled substances were 
found in his possession, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over Count I. R. 83-84 
However, the magistrate declined to hear Mr. Ireland's argument and bound the case 
over. R. 83-84. In response to Mr. Ireland's argument, the state filed a motion for a 
pretrial ruling on jurisdiction. R. 83-93. The state argued that even though it could not 
prove where Mr. Ireland ingested the drug, the trial court had jurisdiction over Count I 
,f[b]ecause a significant quantity of methamphetamine was found in defendant's blood, 
within Utah, it is reasonable to infer that he owned, controlled, retained, or ingested the 
substance within Utah. And ingesting the substance (by inhalation, swallowing, or 
2Mr. Ireland argued below that the urine sample was illegally obtained. 
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injection) really only began the physiological process of "consumption,' which continued 
so long as the methamphetamine was being metabolized in defendant's body.11 R. 85-86. 
The trial court agreed with the state and ruled that it had jurisdiction over Count I. R. 
206-207. 
Subsequently Mr. Ireland, with the agreement of both the state and the trial court, 
entered a conditional guilty plea to both charges pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 
(UtahCt. App. 1988), preserving this issue. R. 169-178; 254. Mr. Ireland was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years on Count I and 180 days on 
Count 2 to run concurrently with Count 1. R. 191-196; 255. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in interpreting the term "consumption11 within the definition 
of "possession or use" under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd) outside its ordinary 
meaning to include an "ongoing process" which consists of the "[body's] physiological 
metabolism of [a] substance." R. 207. Given the trial court's erroneous interpretation, 
the trial court improperly determined that it was unnecessary for the state to prove where 
Mr. Ireland ingested the methamphetamine in order to establish jurisdiction. Instead, the 
trial court concluded that the state could establish that Mr. Ireland "possessed or used" a 
controlled substance in Utah based solely on evidence of methamphetamine found in Mr. 
Ireland's blood. The trial court's failure to require the state to prove that at least some of 
the substance was consumed in Utah violated Appellant's right to due process in 
6 
violation of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
STATE COULD ESTABLISH MR. IRELAND "POSSESSED OR USED" A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN, g 58-37-2m(d<T> 
(2002) BASED SOLELY ON EVIDENCE OF 0.1 MCG/ML 
METHAMPHETAMINE FOUND IN APPELLANT'S BLOOD. 
Count I of the information charged Mr. Ireland with Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (2002), claiming that Mr. Ireland "did knowingly and intentionally have in his 
possession a controlled substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II Controlled 
Substance." R. 1-3. At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Ireland argued that Count I should 
not be bound over because the state presented insufficient evidence that Utah had 
jurisdiction. R. 84. The magistrate declined to hear Mr. Ireland's jurisdictional 
argument and bound the case over. R. 84. 
In response to Mr. Ireland's argument, the state filed a motion for a pretrial ruling 
on jurisdiction with the trial court. R. 83-93. In its motion, the state argued that Utah 
had jurisdiction over Count I even though the state could not "say, with certainty, where 
defendant was when he ingested the drug." R. 83. The state based its argument on a 
theory that "consumption," as used with the definition of "possession or use" in Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37-2(l)(dd), includes the body's physiological metabolism of a 
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substance. Therefore, the state argued, because Mr. Ireland had methamphetamine in his 
blood while in Utah, it "naturally supports the inference that he had, not long previously, 
the ability and intent to control it" within Utah. R. 83-93 (emphasis added). The trial 
court determined that "the State need not prove where defendant ingested the 
methamphetamine," adopting instead the state's definition of "consumption" to find that 
Utah had jurisdiction. R. 207. 
A. Due Process Requires the State to Prove That At Least Some of the 
Controlled Substance was Consumed in Utah. 
The trial court erred in its finding that "the [s]tate need not prove where 
[Mr. Ireland] ingested the methamphetamine" in order to establish jurisdiction. R. 207. 
For an individual to be subject to prosecution within Utah, the state must establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the offense was "committed either wholly or partly 
within the state." Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-201(l)(a) (1999); see also Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-501(3) ("The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense 
but shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence.") "An offense is committed 
partly within this state if either the conduct which is any element of the offense, or the 
result which is such an element, occurs within this state." Utah Code Ann. §76-1-
201(2). 
Mr. Ireland was charged with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) sets 
out the elements of the offense stating: 
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(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or 
use a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a 
valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while 
acting in the course of his professional practice, or as 
otherwise authorized by this chapter. 
Id 
Despite the absence of any evidence that Mr. Ireland possessed or used a 
controlled substance within Utah as set out in section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) or as defined in 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd), the state argued that Utah had jurisdiction over Count 
I M[b]ecause a significant quantity of methamphetamine was found in defendant's blood, 
within Utah, [therefore] it is reasonable to infer that he owned, controlled, retained, or 
ingested the substance within Utah." R. 85 (emphasis added). The state theorized that 
ingesting a substance "really only beg[ins] the physiological process of 'consumption,' 
which continue[s] so long as the methamphetamine [is] being metabolized in [the] body." 
R. 85-86. According to the state, "consumption" or "use" is established any time a 
substance is found in a defendant's body because the presence of the substance "naturally 
supports the inference that he had, not long previously, the ability and intent to control 
it." R. 86 (emphasis added). This position is contrary, however, to case law from this 
Court and this Court's determination that reliance on such inferences or presumptions 
unconstitutionally shifts the "burden of proof on the fact of jurisdiction to [a] defendant 
in violation of the due process clause of Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and 
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the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." State v. 
Sorenson. 758 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In State v. Sorenson, this Court already rejected an argument by the state which 
was similar to the argument made in this case. See Sorenson. 758 P.2d 466. In 
Sorenson. an officer smelled a "strong odor of alcohol" when he stopped the defendant, a 
minor, for speeding. 758 P.2d at 467. The officer asked the defendant to blow in his 
face at which time the officer determined that the alcohol odor was coming from the 
defendant's breath. IdL The officer searched the defendant's vehicle but did not find any 
alcohol or empty containers. IcL The officer did not administer a field sobriety test or an 
intoxilyzer test but arrested the defendant, after he became belligerent, for "'possession' 
of an alcoholic beverage by a minor in violation of [Utah Code Ann.]§ 32A-12-13(1), 
which prohibits the purchase, possession, or consumption of alcohol by a person under 
the age of 21."3 Id 
At trial, the only evidence the state offered was the officer's opinion that Sorenson 
was under the influence of alcohol. IcL The officer testified that "he did not know when 
or where the alcohol had been consumed, nor did he actually see [the defendant] 
consume, purchase or possess any alcohol." Id. The state argued that "while it did not 
know where the offense occurred, there exists a presumption that consumption occurred 
3Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-13(1) was renumbered to Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-
209 (Supp. 2003) and contains only minor changes. 
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within Utah unless rebutted by other credible evidence." Id.. The trial court agreed with 
the state's theory that unless the defendant offered some explanation that the alcohol was 
not consumed in Utah it "created an inference that the drinking occurred near the scene 
of the arrest." Id. Based on the trial court's reasoning that the "natural inference" and 
"statistical probability" that "the drinking occurred in or about the area where the arrest 
occurred," the trial court found the defendant guilty. Id., at 468. 
The defendant appealed arguing, inter alia, that the trial court's inferences and 
presumptions regarding the location of consumption improperly shifted the burden of 
proof on the issue of jurisdiction to the defendant violating his due process rights. Id_. 
This Court agreed stating, "The use of any mandatory rebuttable presumption which 
'requires the jury to find the presumed element unless the defendant persuades the jury 
that such a finding is unwarranted' is one such evidentiary device found to be 
unconstitutional." Id. at 469 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 n.2 (1985)). 
This Court determined that the defendant's conviction under the consumption theory 
"necessarily requires proof of the jurisdictional factor that at least some alcohol was 
consumed in Utah." Id. at 470. Instead, the state "put on absolutely no evidence of 
jurisdiction but relied instead entirely on the presumption that the consumption of 
alcohol occurred within the state." Id.. This Court specifically noted that its decision was 
not premised on "the fortuitous circumstance of the locus of the arrest and its proximity 
to a state border." Id. 
11 
Although decided under a different statute, this Court's reasoning in Sorenson is 
directly applicable to this case. Similar to Sorenson. Mr. Ireland was convicted under a 
"'possession or use by consumption' theory." R. 83. The State admitted that it had no 
evidence of the location where Mr. Ireland ingested the substance. R. 83, 206. Despite 
this lack of evidence, the trial court predicated its finding of jurisdiction on the state's 
novel definition of "consumption," and its theory that "it is reasonable to infer that 
[Mr. Ireland] owned, controlled, retained, or ingested the substance within Utah" based 
solely on the presence of methamphetamine in Mr. Ireland's blood. R. 85, 207 (emphasis 
added). The trial court went even further, to find that it was completely unnecessary for 
the state to prove where ingestion of the methamphetamine occurred in order to establish 
jurisdiction. R. 207. The trial court's finding is directly at odds with this Court's 
determination that it is necessary for the state to establish jurisdiction by proving that at 
least some of the substance was consumed in Utah. See Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 470. 
The trial court erred in finding that jurisdiction over the possession charge was 
established based entirely on the presence of methamphetamine in Mr. Ireland's blood 
and is a direct violation of Mr. Ireland's due process rights. Furthermore, the state's and 
trial court's definition of "consumption" is outside its ordinary meaning and is without 
support in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions. 
B. The Plain Meaning of "Consumption" As Used Within Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-2qydd) Does Not Include A Substance Being Metabolized In the 
Body. 
12 
In order for the trial court to retain jurisdiction it had to find that the offense of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance was "committed either wholly or partly 
within the state." Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-201(l)(a). The trial court supported its finding 
of jurisdiction by adopting the state's definition of "consumption" as a continuing 
process which "includes defendant's physiological metabolism of the substance." R. 
207. Therefore, the trial court concluded, because "that process occurred at least partly 
within Utah" the trial court had jurisdiction. R. 207. Neither case law nor dictionary 
definitions support interpreting the term "consumption" in this manner. Hence, the trial 
court erred in adopting the state's definition of "consumption" as it is used within Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd) (2002). 
"When interpreting a statute, this [CJourt looks first to the statute's plain language 
to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose" . . . reading "'the plain language of the 
statute as a whole . . . . ' " State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sundance Dev. Corp.. 2003 
UT App 367, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (citations omitted). The court's purpose when 
interpreting statutory language is "'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and 
meaningful,' and . . . presume the legislature use[d] each term advisedly and . . . 
according to its ordinary meaning." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, [^52, 63 P.3d 621 
(alterations in original) (citations omitted). In doing so, the court seeks to "'avoid 
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.'" Id., 
(citations omitted). 
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"Consumption" is used in conjunction with other words to define "Possession" or 
"Use" under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd), which reads in part as follows: 
(dd) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control, 
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, 
inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from 
distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or 
group possession or use of controlled substances . . . . For a person to be a 
possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he be 
shown to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the substance, 
but it is sufficient if it is shown that . . . the controlled substance is found in 
a place or under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and 
the intent to exercise dominion and control over it. 
Ii 
Webster's defines "consume" as "to use up, eat, waste,. .., to take." Webster's 
New World College Dictionary (Webster's) 313 (4th ed. 1999). "Consumption" is defined 
as "a consuming or being consumed" and "the amount consumed." Id_. Black's Law 
Dictionary does not define "consume" but defines "consumption" as "[t]he act of 
destroying a thing by using it; the use of a thing in a way that thereby exhausts it." 
Black's Law Dictionary 254 (Abridged 7th ed. 2000). These definitions illustrate that 
"consumption" is a present tense word, an act that is taking place at the moment a 
substance is being introduced into the body. The plain meaning of "consumption" does 
not suggest that it is the continuous processing of a substance being metabolized within 
the body. The plain meaning of "consumption" is even more readily apparent when it is 
viewed in context with the other descriptive words surrounding it. "Application" is "the 
act of applying" "the act of putting something to use." Webster's at 68. "Inhalation" is 
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"the act of inhaling" IcL at 734. "Swallow" is defined as "to pass (food, drink, etc.) from 
the mouth through the . . . esophagus into the stomach" and as "the act of swallowing." 
Id. at 1444. "Injection" is "an act or instance of injecting" "something injected" "a liquid 
injected into the body." Id. at 735. 
"[Amplication, inhalation, swallowing, injection, [and] consumption" are all 
present tense words describing the act of introducing a substance into the body. It would 
be absurd to believe that when using the word "consumption" within its ordinary 
meaning it is not only the act of eating, drinking, or taking a drug into the body at its 
initial inception but is an act that continues "so long as the [substance is] being 
metabolized in [the] body." R. 86. 
In Sorenson, the defendant was charged with possession of alcohol even though 
no alcohol or other "tangible evidence of alcohol" was found. 758 P.2d 466, 467. On 
appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, that the presence of alcohol in the bloodstream 
did not constitutes "possession" within the meaning of the minor in possession statute. 
This Court decline to address the defendant's claim because the trial court did not rely on 
that theory in its decision. Id. at 468. However, this Court favorably referred to one 
judge's determination that "the mere presence of alcohol in the bloodstream does not 
constitute possession under [Utah's minor in possession] statute" noting that this judge's 
determination was "consistent with well-reasoned decisions from other jurisdiction 
which have addressed the issue." Id., at 468 n.2. 
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In the present case, the state argued that Utah had jurisdiction to try Mr. Ireland 
with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance contending it was reasonable to 
infer that Mr. Ireland "owned, controlled, retained, or ingested the substance within 
Utah,11 because methamphetamine was found in Mr. Ireland's blood. R. 85-86. "And 
ingesting the substance (by inhalation, swallowing, or injection) [the state argued] really 
only began the physiological process of "consumption/ which continued so long as the 
methamphetamine was being metabolized in defendant's body." R. 85-86. However, 
other jurisdictions which have been presented with similar arguments have determined 
that once a substance is within a person's bloodstream it can no longer be possessed or 
used. 
In State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208 (Kan. 1983), the Supreme Court of Kansas 
addressed the issue of whether a defendant could be charged with possession of a 
controlled substance based entirely on positive blood tests for an illegal substance. Id.. 
In Flinchpaugh, the defendant was involved in an automobile accident which resulted in 
the death of the driver of the other car. IcL at 209-210. While at the hospital, the 
defendant consented to having her blood drawn which tested positive for cocaine and/or 
benzoylecgonine. Id. at 210. Although the state did not have any evidence of how, 
where, or when the substance was "introduced into the defendant's system," it charged 
her with possession. IcL The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss stating 
"'[a] human being does not possess a narcotic drug which is located in his bloodstream.'" 
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Id. at 210. On appeal, the supreme court agreed, determining that the ordinary meaning 
of "possession" does not include a substance found entirely in the bloodstream. The 
court concluded that: 
Once a controlled substance is within a person's system, the power of the 
person to control, possess, use, dispose of, or cause harm is at an end. The 
drug is assimilated by the body. The ability to control the drug is beyond 
human capabilities.... 
Id at 211 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in State v. Hornaday. 713 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986) superceded by statute 
on other grounds, the Supreme Court of Washington concluded that "consume" and 
"possess" "do not include the stage at which [a substance] has already been swallowed 
but is still being assimilated by the body." Id. at 76. In Hornaday, the defendant, a 
minor, was charged with illegal consumption or possession of alcohol, and resisting 
arrest. Id at 73. The defendant argued that he could not be guilty of illegal consumption 
or possession because the arresting officer did not observe him do either. Id_ The trial 
court, denying defendant's motion to dismiss, concluded "that the defendant 'was 
intoxicated and therefore was in possession of liquor because it was in his body.'" Id_ 
On appeal, the defendant argued that "his arrest for illegal consumption or possession of 
alcohol was unlawful because . . . the alleged commission of the misdemeanor did not 
occur 'in the presence' of the arresting officer." Id.4 
4Although this appeal concerned whether the defendant was violating the 
underage drinking statute in the presence of the arresting officer by having alcohol in his 
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The state first argued that the defendant's arrest was lawful because alcohol was 
in the defendant's system, therefore, defendant was in possession of the alcohol in the 
presence of the officer. Id. at 76. The supreme court noted that "[w]hether the crime 
occurred 'in the presence of the officer turns on the meaning of the words 'possession' 
and 'consume' as used in [Wash. Rev. Code] § 66.44.270.5" Id, at 74. Quickly 
disposing of the state's first theory, the supreme court stated that like narcotics, once 
alcohol "is within a person's system, the power of a person to control, possess« use or 
dispose of it is at an end. The drug is assimilated by the body. The essential element of 
control is absent." IdL at 75 (emphasis added). Next, the state argued "that consumption 
is an ongoing process and therefore, as long as alcohol remained in the defendant's 
bloodstream, it was in the process of being consumed." Id_ at 76. The supreme court 
disagreed, noting that such an interpretation was not within the common definition of 
consumption. IdL Further, the court reasoned that such an interpretation would subject a 
minor to arrest in Washington anytime he enters the state "with any trace of liquor still 
present in his body." Id at 77. Thus, although he did not drink any intoxicating liquor 
within the state, he might still be subject to arrest for "consuming" liquor in the presence 
body thereby making his arrest lawful, the court's detailed analysis and interpretation of 
the terms "possession" and "consume" are directly applicable to the issue in this case. 
5Wash. Rev. Code § 66.44.270 states in part, "It is unlawful for any person under 
the age of twenty-one years to acquire or have in his possession or consume any liquor . . 
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of a police officer who happened to notice his condition or who smelled alcohol on his 
breath." Id 
In State v. Abu-Shanab, 448 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. App. 1989), the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals also rejected interpreting "consumption" as a continuing offense so 
long as the substance remains in the body. IcL In Abu-Shanab. the defendant was 
convicted of consumption of alcohol by a minor. IcL at 558.6 At trial, the state presented 
evidence that the defendant was under 21 years of age and evidence of the odor of 
alcohol on the defendant's breath. IcL at 559. However, the state had no evidence that 
the defendant had been drinking within any Minnesota county. IcL The state argued that 
consumption should be treated "as a continuing offense because as long as alcohol 
remains in the system of a minor, the minor continues to 'consume5 alcohol, in violation 
of the statute." Id. Rejecting the state's argument, the court of appeals noted that "a 
continuing offense most commonly arises in response to a statute of limitations defense" 
citing to examples of such cases as possession of firearms or illegal possession of 
property. Id at 559. The court reasoned that 
[t]hese [types of cases] suggest that in a "continuing offense" the status of a 
person or object, rather than the occurrence of a single, time-limited act, 
determines whether a crime has been or is being committed. A continuing 
offense is one which can be committed over an extended period of time. It 
6The defendant was convicted under Minn. Stat. § 340A.503 (1988), which states 
in part "Consumption. It is unlawful for any: (2) person under the age of 21 to consume 
any alcohol beverages " See State v. Abu-Shanab, 448 N.W.2d 557, 558 (Minn. 
1989). 
19 
is the nature of the crime itself which distinguishes a "continuing" offense 
from one which may said to be "completed," such as an assault. 
Id 
Noting the rejection of similar arguments in Hornaday and Sorenson. the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that "'consume/ in the context of alcoholic 
beverages, means to drink, and that once drunk, alcohol is no longer being consumed." 
Abu-Shanab, 448 N.W.2d at 559. This reasoning applies with equal force to other 
substances "consumed." 
The reasoning of these courts illustrates that the ordinary meaning of the term 
consumption is the initial act of introducing a substance into the body. That once an 
individual has eaten his sandwich or has drunk his coffee he is not still consuming his 
lunch or beverage an hour later because his body is in the process of digesting it. 
Moreover, interpreting "consumption" under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd), to 
include a substance being metabolized in the blood without proof of possession or use at 
a particular time and place would relieve "the state of its burden of proof on the fact of 
jurisdiction and [would be] unconstitutional under the standard articulated in In re 
Winship. [397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1072-1073, (1970)] requiring the 
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime charged." Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 469 (noting that although jurisdiction is not an 
element of the offense, the Winship rule "is not limited to those facts essential to 
establish the elements of the offense [as defined by statute]"). Such a determination 
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could also potentially give rise to other constitutional concerns by making "status" 
criminals of narcotic addicts who would be "continuously guilty of [possession or use of 
a controlled substance], whether or not he has ever used or possessed any narcotics 
within the State." Robinson v. California. 370 U.S. 660, 762-763, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 1420 
(1962) (holding "a state law which imprisons [a narcotic addict] as a criminal, even 
though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State . . . inflicts a cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."). 
In sum, the trial court erred in interpreting "consumption" as an ongoing process 
which includes the physiological metabolism of a substance. "Consumption" when read 
in context with the other descriptive terms surround it in section 58-37-2(l)(dd), supports 
only an interpretation of the initial act of introducing a substance into the body. Any 
other interpretation would have absurd results rendering the statute superfluous or 
inoperative. Therefore, the trial court's finding that it had jurisdiction because the state 
could establish that Mr. Ireland "possessed or used" a control substance in Utah based 
solely on evidence of methamphetamine found in Mr. Ireland's blood was erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant JEFFREY DON IRELAND respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the convictions. 
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SUBMITTED THIS / ¥ « day of January, 2004. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 
6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this /*/** day of 
January, 2004. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of January, 2004. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
450 South State Street, P.O. Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
SENTENCE/JUDGMENT/COMMITMENT/ORDER 
Criminal/Traffic 
CITWSTATE Plaintiff 
-VS-
Case Number C A O P v Q O r ^ b 
Tape number C # 
Cfc^?^ i&e\ard 
DOEfcjV/H/^ 
Defendant 
Interpreter 
CHARGES. Amended 
. Amended 
D a t e \ \ \ X g A O & Time V f t U H f t O n 
Judge/Comm 
Clerk V f f o 
Plaintiff Counsel 
Defense Counsel ( 2 f ^ T Y \ Q 
THE COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS: 
(1) J a i l _ A j Z X Q D Suspended 
Defendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence _ 
(2) Fine Amt. $ Susp. $ 
C O ^ U J W J O C 
Fee$_ Fine Bai $. 
Payment Schedule: 
(3) Court Costs $ 
Pay$_ per month/1 st Pmt. Due 
TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $ 
Last Pmt. Due 
(4) Community Service/WP_ 
(5) Restitution $ 
through 
Pay to: • Court • Victim • Show Proof to Court 
Attorney Fees $ 
(6) Probation • Good Behavior • AP&P • ACEC • Other 
(7) Terms of probation: 
ISfNo Further Violations 
• AA Meetings ./wk. 
• Counseling thru. 
. / month • Classes 
• Follow Program 
• No Alcohol 
• Antibuse 
• Employment 
• Proof of 
• In/Out Treatment. 
• Health Testing 
• Crime Lab Procedure 
• 
• 
(8) Plea in Abeyance Diversion 
(9) Review / / at _ 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third District 
Court at 238-7391, at least three working days prior to the proceeding. 
APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF JUDGEMENT 
J w cM~ ^ ' ^ L 
District Court Judg 
INTEREST WILL BE ADDED IF FINE AND/OR RESTITUTION NOT P A I D ^ f P } ^ ^ 
;;:Jiy 
?©flON"OF JUO Vw 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. __ 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
Case No. r ^ L \ Q O ^ n ^ ^ 
Count No. i 
Hono rab le iTQLC i f ^ f . 
Clerk j f f i E _ _ _ Z 
Reporter 
Bailiff 
Date \VA?H33 
D The motion of _to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by • a iury; • the court, pCglea of guilty; 
• plea of no contest; of the offense of \ \ \ Q T F f ^ / o S € . C j ^ j , a felony 
of the^b degree. D a class misdemeanor, being now present incpurt and ready for sentence and 
represented by &CCOQJL and the State being represented b\/{ \ \MyOM. is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D 
D 
a 
a 
a 
a 
to a indeterminate term not to exceed one year. • at defendant's election. 
to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be life; 
not to exceed five years; 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
not to exceed years; 
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ Jo. 
yi^ such sentence is to run concurrently with C f t O f ^ ^ ^ 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• 
D 
D 
upon motion of D State, D Defense, a Court, Court(s). .are hereby dismissed. 
X 
X 
Defendant is granted a stay of above (• prison) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County^tfor delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this judgment and commitment. 
Commitment shall issue 
DATED this \<~> day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney 
STAMF USED AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE 
Page of 
(White-Court) (Green-Judge) (Yeltow-Jail/Prison/AP&P) (Pink-Defense) (GoWenrod-State) 
ADDENDUM B 
58-37-8 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
58-37-2 
(dd) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, 
control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the 
application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distin-
guished from distribution, of controlled substances and includes individ-
ual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances. For a person 
to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that 
he be shown to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the 
substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly 
participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of 
any substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the 
controlled substance is found in a place or under circumstances indicating 
that the person had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and 
control over it. 
76-1-201, Jurisdiction of offenses. 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this s tate for an offense which he 
commits, while either within or outside the state, by his own conduct or tha t of 
another for which he is legally accountable, if: 
(a) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the state; 
(b) the conduct outside the state constitutes an at tempt to commit an 
offense within the state; 
(c) the conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an 
offense within the state and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs 
in the state; or 
(d) the conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or 
conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense under the laws of 
both this state and such other jurisdiction. 
(2) An offense is committed partly within this s tate if either the conduct 
which is any element of the offense, or the result which is such an element, 
occurs within this state. 
(3) In homicide offenses, the "result" is either the physical contact which 
causes death or the death itself. 
(a) If the body of a homicide victim is found within the state, the death 
shall be presumed to have occurred within the state. 
(b) If jurisdiction is based on such a presumption, this state shall retain 
jurisdiction unless the defendant proves by clear and convincing evidence 
that: 
(i) the result of the homicide did not occur in this state; and 
(ii) the defendant did not engage in any conduct in this state which 
is any element of the offense. 
(4) An offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by 
the law of this s tate is committed within the state regardless of the location of 
the offender at the time of the omission. 
(5) The judge shall determine jurisdiction. 
76-1-202. Venue of actions. 
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county, district, or precinct where 
the offense is alleged to have been committed. In determining the proper place 
of trial, the following provisions shall apply: 
(a) If the commission of an offense commenced outside the state is 
consummated within this state, the offender shall be tried in the county 
where the offense is consummated. 
(b) When conduct constituting elements of an offense or results that 
constitute elements, whether the conduct or result constituting elements 
is in itself unlawful, shall occur in two or more counties, trial of the offense 
may be held in any of the counties concerned. 
(c) If a person committing an offense upon the person of another is 
located in one county and his victim is located in another county at the 
time of the commission of the offense, trial may be held in either county. 
(d) If a cause of death is inflicted in one county and death ensues in 
another county, the offender may be tried in either county. 
(e) A person who commits an inchoate offense may be tried in any 
county in which any act that is an element of the offense, including the 
agreement in conspiracy, is committed. 
(f) Where a person in one county solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or 
at tempts to aid another in the planning or commission of an offense in 
another county, he may be tried for the offense in either county. 
(g) When an offense is committed within this state and it cannot be 
readily determined in which county or district the offense occurred, the 
following provisions shall be applicable: 
(i) When an offense is committed upon any railroad car, vehicle, 
watercraft, or aircraft passing within this state, the offender may be 
tried in any county through which such railroad car, vehicle, water-
craft, or aircraft has passed. 
(ii) When an offense is committed on any body of water bordering 
on or within this state, the offender may be tried in any county 
adjacent to such body of water. The words "body of water" shall 
include but not be limited to any stream, river, lake, or reservoir, 
whether natural or man-made. 
(hi) A person who commits theft may be tried in any county in 
which he exerts control over the property affected. 
(iv) If an offense is committed on or near the boundary of two or 
more counties, trial of the offense may be held in any of such counties. 
(v) For any other offense, trial may be held in the county in which 
the defendant resides, or, if he has no fixed residence, in the county in 
which he is apprehended or to which he is extradited. 
(2) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless 
made before trial. 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the 
offense* defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until 
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct pro-
scribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense 
but shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law J 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec, 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
